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Abstract 
This article contributes to the growing scholarly literature endeavouring to explain Russia’s 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. While much of the debate relies on the grand 
theories of International Relations such as realism, liberalism, or constructivism, this article 
approaches the puzzle from a psychological point of view and discusses several middle-range 
theories within this genre. These theories are examined sympathetically but critically, spelling 
out the added value they might have in elucidating Russian foreign policy, while also 
considering the methodological limitations in producing plausible explanations. Moreover, the 
article strives to overcome the traditional juxtaposition between the idea of rationality as a 
standard account of agency, and various psychological interpretations. Obvious 
methodological problems notwithstanding, the article concludes that cognitive and 
psychological features – such as the possibility of groupthink, assessment of prospects, 
operational codes and belief systems, personality characteristics, and emotions – can be applied 
to the Russian case and they can all explain Russia’s higher willingness to take risks in the 
context of the Ukrainian crisis. In that way they can provide with partial explanations, and 
indeed are important elements of our understanding of Russian foreign policy in general and 
the Crimean case in particular.  
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 Introduction 
Russia’s intervention in and subsequent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, and the 
ensuing developments in Ukraine and Russia-West relations, provides a contemporary 
challenge not only for policymaking but also for the foreign policy scholarly community. What 
explains Russia’s decision-making and behaviour?1 While full-fledged explanations or 
interpretations, based on detailed empirical investigation, have yet to emerge, we are not short 
of theoretically grounded post-factum analyses. Typically, many familiar explanations draw on 
mainstream International Relations (IR) grand theories – realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism – and are in one way or another rooted in the wider context of Russia-West 
relations. Yet, the key role of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia would call instead for 
psychological approaches traditionally at the heart of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). 
However, such explanations are difficult to present with any certainty due to the lack of 
transparency in Russian decision-making. Yet, the paradox is that the less we have access to 
the actual decision-making process, the more important the psychological dimension might be, 
at least potentially.2   
 
While Russia’s behaviour in the Ukrainian crisis surprised the policy community, it is also 
clear that an overwhelming majority of scholars of international relations and Russian politics, 
irrespective of their theoretical orientation, failed in their forecasts. In a poll conducted among 
905 American researchers about a week before Russia invaded Crimea, only 14 per cent of 
those interviewed responded affirmatively to a question on whether Russia would interfere 
militarily in Ukrainian affairs.3 The fact that all IR schools failed to anticipate Russia’s 
behaviour but still provide the most well-known explanations of the case reminds us that 
concepts such as national interest or identity are so vague that one can always use them to 
                                                             
1 See e.g. Elizabeth Wood, William Pomeranz, E. Wayne Merry and Maxim Trudolyubov, Roots of Russia’s 
War in Ukraine (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2016); Elias Götz, ‘Putin, the State and 
War: The Causes of Russia’s Near Abroad Assertion Revisited’, International Studies Review, 2016, early view. 
2 Cf. James Rosenau, ‘Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy' by James Rosenau, in R. B. Farrell (ed.) 
Approaches in Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 
27-92. 
3 Erik Voeten, “Who predicted Russia’s military intervention?” Washington Post (March 12, 2014), available at: 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/12/who-predicted-russias-military-
intervention-2/>; Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers and Michael J. Tierney, “Snap Poll: The View 
from the Ivory Tower”, Foreign Policy (March 7, 2014), available at: 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/07/snap_poll_the_view_from_the_ivory_tower_syria_defense_
ukraine_russia> and the detailed results available: <http://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/trip/snap-polls/snap-poll-
results-march-2014/index.php>. 
retrospectively explain an event which was regarded as unlikely beforehand on the basis of the 
very same concepts. 
 
Indeed, there is already a plethora of scholarly explanations reflecting the common theoretical 
approaches to Russian foreign policy that account for Russia’s policy in the Ukraine conflict 
and the decision to annex Crimea. Perhaps the most famous is John Mearsheimer’s offensive 
structural realism.4 He argues that Russia’s actions in Ukraine should be seen as a self-evident 
reaction to the external context, that is, to the West’s aggressive grand strategy, which exploits 
colour revolutions in Russia’s neighbourhood as one of the weapons in the struggle for power. 
Those who agree with this view see that it is all about geopolitics: Russia’s primary objective 
is to keep Ukraine out of foreign military alliances and geopolitical blocs.5 There is some 
variation of this general theme: for Daniel Treisman, for example, the seizure of Crimea was 
an improvised solution to secure Russia’s possession of the Sevastopol naval base.6 A more 
formalistic approach towards describing this strategic interaction has been presented by 
Richard Ericson and Lester Zeager in pure game-theoretic terms, using the so-called theory of 
moves. The idea is to derive the equilibrium, or ultimate outcome under various assumptions 
about Western and Russian preferences over outcomes. With regard to the endgame, the theory 
concludes that “incomplete information on preferences prevents derivation of a unique 
prediction of the outcome of the crisis, but the analysis enables us to substantially narrow the 
range of possibilities”.7 The example shows that sophisticated models of different scenarios 
can be developed on the basis of rational choice, but ultimately such models also face the 
challenge of empirical data in terms of explanation. Michael McFaul, representing the liberal 
school of thought, claims in turn that the reasons for Russia’s behaviour lie in Russia’s domestic 
politics; Putin reacted to the homegrown threat of a colour revolution and created an external 
crisis to make it possible to enhance the domestic pressure against the opposition and to rally 
the nation around the flag.8 Robert Legvold, whose thinking can be associated with the 
                                                             
4 John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin” 
Foreign Affairs Online (September/October 2014), available at: 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault>. 
5 Elias Götz, “It’s geopolitics, stupid: explaining Russia’s Ukraine policy”, Global Affairs, 1:1 (2015), pp. 3-10. 
6 Daniel Treisman, ‘Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin’, Foreign Affairs Vol 95, No. 3, 
2016, pp. 47-54. 
7 Richard E. Ericson and Lester A. Zeager, “Ukraine Crisis 2014: A Study of Russian- 
Western Strategic Interaction”, Peace Econ. Peace Sci. Pub. Pol. 21(2) (2015), pp. 153–190. 
8 Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich and John J. Mearsheimer, “Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine 
Crisis?”, Foreign Affairs Online (November/December 2014), available at: 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142260/michael-mcfaul-stephen-sestanovich-john-j-
mearsheimer/faulty-powers>. 
constructivist school, argues that the Cold War’s lesson for contemporary Russia and the US 
is that it is the interaction between the two sides, rather than the actions of only one side, that 
creates the spiral in tensions.9 This can be understood as an external dimension of identity 
politics. Ted Hopf has argued how partly because of external iinteraction Russian national 
identity discours4es changed so that the annexation of Crimea became both thinkable and 
natural by 2014.10 A more internal identity dimension is what some analysts see as the Russian 
use of “bio-politics”, that is, claiming to defend the interests of “compatriots” in the “Russian 
world”.11 These theories are not necessarily in direct competition with each other. Andrei 
Tsygankov, for example, suggests that both interests and values explain Russia’s behaviour in 
the Ukrainian crisis.12 Roy Allison combines the above explanations, considering that one has 
to understand the geopolitics, identity and domestic political influences in order to explain 
Russia’s conduct in this case.13 Elias Götz also concludes his survey of theories attempting to 
explain Russia’s assertive policy in the “near abroad” by warning against mono-causal 
approaches and stating that future research should develop different synthetic explanations.14 
 
We will contribute to this debate by advancing a set of psychological approaches15. This should 
not be seen as a case for mono-causal explanations but as an attempt to construct theoretically 
sustained psychological explanations, to assess them against the background of available 
evidence and to discuss their limitations. Such theories can at best explain only an aspect of 
Russian foreign policy, but without spelling them out first, they cannot be integrated and 
synthesised with other theories. Psychological theories have always been part of the tradition 
of Soviet / Russian foreign policy research but paradoxically in the present context these 
theories have remained marginal and underdeveloped.16 Yet, the need is evident since there has 
also been a remarkable surge in literature focusing on Putin as a person (and it would be a small 
                                                             
9 Robert Legvold, “Managing the New Cold War: What Moscow and Washington Can Learn From the Last 
One”, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2014), pp. 74-84. 
10 Ted hopf, ‘”Crimea is Ours”: A Discursive History’, International Relations Vol. 30 No. 2 (2016) 227-255. 
11 Philipp Casula, “The Road to Crimea: Putin’s Foreign Policy Between Reason of State, Sovereignty and Bio-
Politics”, Russian Analytical Digest No. 148 (2 May 2014), pp. 2-6. 
12 Andrei Tsygankov, “Vladimir Putin’s Last Stand: the Sources of Russia’s Ukraine Policy”, Post-Soviet 
Affairs, Vol. 31, No 4 (2015) pp. 279-303. 
13 Roy Allison, “Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules”, International 
Affairs Vol. 90, No. 6 (2014), pp. 1255–1297. 
14 Götz, Putin, the State and War, p. 21. 
15 For a parallel contribution, see Tor Bukkvoll, ‘Why Putin Went to War: Ideology, Interests and Decision-
making in the Russian use of Force in Crimea and Donbas’, Contemporary Politics, Vol 22, No. 3, (2016), pp. 
267-282. 
16 See e.g. Alexander Sergunin, Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behavior : Theory and Practice (Stuttgart: 
ibidem). 
wonder if this were not the case, given that Putin was named by Forbes the most powerful man 
in the world in 2016).17 Although we should not exaggerate the psychological perspective let 
alone make it pre-eminent, we need to account for the psychological aspects of agency. Our 
attitude towards these approaches is sympathetic but critical at the same time. This new semi-
academic branch of “Putinology”, reminiscent of the old “Kremlinological” tradition in that 
much of it is based on the art of second-guessing the inner dynamics of an opaque system, 
cannot be entirely dismissed but it has not evolved in a cumulative and integrative manner with 
the aim of theory building or development.18 Such theories exist, however, and could be utilised 
more systematically. Unlike IR grand theories, psychological approaches can be located within 
the middle-range theorizing typical of FPA; they are partly but not entirely individual-level 
explanations focusing on a single decision-maker since they can point to both general 
situational psychological tendencies as well as group-level psychological dynamics. These 
approaches rarely claim to offer all-encompassing, comprehensive, or sufficient explanations 
for any decision, but, as we argue, they can provide partial explanations that are nevertheless 
crucial for understanding foreign policy decision-making in cases such as Russia’s intervention 
in Crimea.  
 
We will home in on these approaches in order to examine how they could contribute to the 
explanation of Russia’s decision-making and behaviour in the context of the Ukrainian crisis 
of 2014. In so doing, we will also draw a historical-theoretical picture, and review how these 
approaches have previously been applied to the study of Russian foreign policy in particular. 
We are most willing to admit that the empirical evidence related to psychological theories is 
often speculative and we may never find any “final proof”, but attempts to apply them can 
perhaps better be seen as “hoop tests” that make one theory plausible while not excluding 
others.19 We cannot bring decision-makers to a test laboratory, and nor can we reconstruct the 
real decision-making situations and measure the cognitive and other psychological processes 
directly; at the same time, we do not have any final proof of the superiority of a rational choice 
theory either. Our argument, however, is that obvious methodological problems 
                                                             
17 Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. 2nd Ed. (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2015); Anna Arutunyan, The Putin Mystique: Inside Russia’s Power Cult (Newbold 
on Stour: Skyscraper, 2014); Steven Lee Myers, The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin (New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 2015). See also Fiona Hill, ‘Putin: The One-Man Show the West Doesn’t Understand’, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 72, no 3, 2016, pp. 140-144. 
18 See e.g. Leon Aron, “Putinology”, The American Interest, Vol. 11, No. 1, (July 2015), available at: 
<http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/07/30/putinology/>. For research on Gorbachev and Yeltsin, see 
e.g. George Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002). 
19 Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel, Process-Tracing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016). 
notwithstanding, psychological approaches – such as groupthink, risk-taking patterns, 
operational codes, personality characteristics, and emotions – will not only complement but are 
indeed necessary elements of any in-depth discussion and understanding of Russian foreign 
policy in general and the Crimean case in particular.20 While these approaches are sometimes 
seen as demonizing Putin, in essence, they do exactly the opposite when treating Putin as a 
normal human person potentially following general behavioural patterns in decision-making.  
 
Beyond the juxtaposition of rationality and psychology 
The question of whether Putin is acting rationally or not has been posed in the context of the 
crisis in Ukraine.21 As remarked by Mark Galeotti and Andrew S. Bowen, Russia was by no 
means forced to invade Crimea: “After all, the annexation of Crimea, by any rational 
calculation, did not make sense. Russia already had immense influence on the peninsula, but 
without the need to subsidize it, as Ukraine had. […] The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s position 
in the Crimean seaport of Sevastopol was secure until 2042”.22 In any case, even if the choice 
is seen as rational, Russia was willing to take high risks when violating key norms of 
international law and launching a military campaign. 
 
Such a question – rational or not – often assumes that we can juxtapose rationality and 
psychology, but this is often impossible. To begin with, there are several types of rationality. 
A strict methodological definition of rationality – as proposed by positivist science – is that a 
theory should not treat persons as individuals with their own psychology and preferences, but 
rather it seeks to turn individual behaviour into that conducted by anybody in a similar 
situation.23 Mainstream political realism has turned this into a normative claim that the pursuit 
of national interest, defined as power, should guide the foreign policy of a state if it desires to 
be successful and survive.24 The mere notion of instrumental rationality, however, does not 
                                                             
20 As Elizabeth Wood suggests, “Russian actions may combine the rational and the irrational, as well as short- 
and long-term considerations”, in Wood, Pomeranz, Merry and Trudolyubov, op. cit., p. 19. 
21 Alexander Motyl, “Is Putin Rational?” Foreign Affairs Online (18 March, 2014), available at: 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141039/alexander-j-motyl/is-putin-rational>. See also Rajan Menon, 
“Putin’s Rational Choices”, Foreign Affairs Online (29 February, 2016), available at: 
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2016-02-29/putins-rational-choices>. 
22 Mark Galeotti and Andrew S. Bowen, “Putin’s Empire of the Mind: How Russia’s president morphed from 
realist to ideologue – and what he’ll do next”, Foreign Policy (April 21, 2014), available at: 
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/21/putins-empire-of-the-mind/>. 
23 Karl Popper, The Myth of Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 
168. 
24 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Kopf, 
1955). 
predict anything about what an actor should want in a choice situation. Rationality is merely 
understood as a process of gathering sufficient information about costs and benefits and then 
choosing the option more likely to lead to a better outcome, according to the pre-existing 
desires among the available alternatives.25 Bounded rationality, in turn, is already a step 
towards taking into account psychological factors, as it emphasises the improbability of optimal 
choice in most cases. The decision-maker is, rather, a “satisfier”: one seeking a satisfactory 
solution based on imperfect information and in the presence of cognitive biases. Thus the 
decision-maker stops considering alternatives when he thinks that he has found a satisfactory 
solution, even if it were not the optimal.26 
 
There are basically three ways to understand the relationship between rationality and 
psychology with regard to decision-making. The first has already been alluded to: 
psychological approaches are often seen as an antithesis to rational choice methodology. These 
two approaches are understood as mutually exclusive. In this understanding, there is also an 
implicit or explicit normative juxtaposition between a rational decision-maker and someone 
whose decision-making is seemingly negatively affected by psychological attributes, such as 
stress, ideological prejudices, or emotions. The second approach regards the degree of 
rationality vs. psychology as some kind of continuum. Indeed, psychological theories dealing 
with decision-making vary in how much they overlap with instrumental or bounded rationality. 
While human beings strive mostly for some kind of rationality in their actions, psychological 
approaches, however, discuss the limits of rationality and reveal some features in human 
behaviour which, from a very strict rational choice approach, may appear as anomalies. The 
point of psychological approaches, therefore, is that they normalize these anomalies. A third, 
and more recent approach assumes that it is more fruitful to understand rationality as a part of 
human psychology, rather than seeing rationality and psychology as opposite components. 
Psychological and, above all, neurological research has made great strides in recent years in 
understanding the importance of emotions, particularly during decision-making. In this latest 
research, what is noteworthy is the realization that emotions are not necessarily the opposite of 
rationality, arising as impulses in the mind only in extreme situations. Rather, emotions are 
essential to human rationality and are always present in decision-making, since rational 
                                                             
25 Jon Elster, Rational Choice (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
26 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1947). 
information processing and emotion in the human brain are physically and functionally much 
more closely integrated than previously thought.27 
 
Within the set of psychological approaches – both cognitive and affective – that we will discuss 
below, usually one or another of the above arguments is in the background, which makes these 
approaches themselves somewhat rival explanations vis-à-vis each other. At the same time, 
however, they form a toolbox of useful theoretical perspectives, relying on group dynamics, 
personal characteristics and situational factors that are typically omitted in the IR grand 
theories. 
  
Groupthink in the Kremlin? 
Groupthink has long featured among the most-cited psychological theories in foreign policy 
analysis. Irving L. Janis presented the concept to explain why a small group of decision- 
makers, no matter how astute, can reach not only suboptimal but clearly irrational decisions on 
the most important issues.28 One of his case studies was the disastrous Korean war, in the 
context of which American foreign policy decision-making was characterized by an almost 
naive harmony, mutual admiration and flattery. According to the theory, the reason for false 
decisions may be that, in certain circumstances, the decision-makers do not strive for the best 
solution but for a consensus decision, whereby they omit even clear facts and do not allow any 
contradictory information and opinions to interfere with the group dynamics.  
 
It is interesting to consider Russia’s decision-making in the Crimean question from this 
perspective. What do we know about the decision-making unit and the circumstances? An 
article that comes closest to revealing something about this particular decision-making situation 
appeared in the New York Times on 7 March 2014, that is, dated less than a week after Russian 
troops seized control of the peninsula, and about a month before Russia acknowledged it 
                                                             
27 Andrew Ross, Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2014); Jonathan Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs”, International Organization, Vol. 64, No 1 
(2010), pp. 1-31; Jonathan Mercer “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics”, International 
Organization, Vol. 59, No 1 (2005), pp. 77-106; Rose McDermott, “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of 
Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science”, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No 4 (2004), pp. 691-706; M. 
Goldgeier and P.E. Tetlock, “Psychology and International Relations Theory”, Annual Review of Political 
Science, Vol. 4 (2001), pp. 67-92. 
28 Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd edition (Boston: 
Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 1972/1982). 
publically.29 The article states that the decision to invade Crimea was taken very rashly on 
either February 25 or 26: “The group, the officials and analysts said, included Sergei B. Ivanov, 
Mr. Putin’s chief of staff; Nikolai P. Patrushev, the secretary of the security council; and 
Aleksandr V. Bortnikov, the director of the Federal Security Service. All are veterans of the 
K.G.B. […]”. Only later was the decision communicated to the Security Council and the 
Foreign Ministry.30  
 
This information, from corridor sources of “officials and analysts”, was subsequently circulated 
in other analyses and became the more or less accepted version of events.31 Putin’s own 
statements in a Russian TV documentary at the beginning of 2015, now widely available in 
social media, to some extent confirm this account. According to Putin, however, the decision 
was made during the night between February 22 and 23. In this interview, Putin frames the 
decision as being related to planning the rescue of the deposed Ukrainian president, Viktor 
Yanukovych, but it is not quite clear how this actually made the Crimean intervention 
necessary. Furthermore, he recollects that besides himself there were four colleagues in the 
meeting. Putin does not reveal the names of those four colleagues, but it is probable that they 
included the three mentioned above and Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu, who was allegedly 
present. In any case, Putin states that he himself took the initiative and ordered his colleagues 
to prepare the takeover of Crimea. Yet one gets the impression that the annexation of Crimea 
was not discussed until the very end of the meeting, implying that Putin would have made this 
decision rather spontaneously before the meeting wrapped up: “We ended at about seven in the 
morning. When we were parting, I said to my colleagues: we must start working on returning 
Crimea to Russia”.32 This statement, of course, contradicts the statements made by Putin after 
the intervention, to the effect that Russia had not planned anything in advance, but had just 
reacted to the will of the Crimean people, expressed in a (post factum) referendum.33  
                                                             
29 Steven Lee Myers, “Russia’s Move Into Ukraine Said to Be Born in Shadows”, The New York Times (March 
7, 2014). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Andrew C. Kuchins “Is Putin Having a Brezhnev Moment?” Politico (March 11, 2014), available at: 
<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-brezhnev-moment-crimea-
104547.html#ixzz3PdJ3Utgqhttp://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/putin-brezhnev-moment-crimea-
104547.html#.VMIL703wsdV>. 
32 “Vladimir Putin describes secret meeting when Russia decided to seize Crimea”, The Guardian  (9 March, 
2015), available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/09/vladimir-putin-describes-secret-meeting-
when-russia-decided-to-seize-crimea>. 
33 “’Krymnash’: kak za god menjalas' lozh' Putina ob anneksii poluostrova”, Obozrevatel (10 March, 2015), 
available at: <http://obozrevatel.com/politics/20654-kryimnash-kak-za-god-menyalas-lozh-putina-ob-anneksii-
poluostrova.htm>. 
 There is also some evidence that the idea of annexing Crimea would have been expressed  one 
or two weeks earlier in February 2014 by a powerful business group, in a memorandum 
presented to Putin.34 Others have remarked that the idea was seriously considered in the 
Kremlin as early as December 2013. The question would have been raised by the chairman of 
the Crimean Parliament, Dmitry Konstantinov, when he visited Moscow and met with 
Patrushev, who was positively surprised. Moreover, the possibility of annexing Crimea had 
been discussed as a principal option in the Kremlin back in 2008.35  
 
Nevertheless, the wider narratives of Russia’s foreign-policy formulation point to the 
concentration of  power and the diminishing role of outside influence. It has been proposed that 
when Putin first came to power in 1999/2000, he “listened to a range of opinions”, “being the 
arbiter brokering consensus among various clans and interests”, whereas today his “circle of 
allies and advisors has shrunk to those who only share his exact ideas”. As a consequence, 
“[S]ober technocrats such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defence Minister Sergei 
Shoygu played a seemingly marginal role in the decision-making over Crimea and were 
expected simply to execute the orders from the top”.36 Although it has been claimed that 
Shoygu was hesitant with regard to the military intervention in Ukraine, he did not voice his 
arguments forcefully.37 
 
If these views are correct, we can conclude that the decision-making unit consisted of like-
minded “hawks” belonging to the “siloviks”, whereas all those usually regarded as representing 
a more “liberal” wing were missing. The group was obviously controlled by a strong leader, 
but all the elements conducive to groupthink emerging were present.38 According to the 
groupthink theory, such a constellation of the decision-making unit, with very little space for 
an open and rational search for alternatives, creates a tendency to influence the decision-
making towards increased risk-taking.  
 
                                                             
34 “Predstavljaetsja pravil'nym iniciirovat' prisoedinenie vostochnyh oblastej Ukrainy k Rossii”, Novaja Gazeta 
(24 February, 2015), available at: < http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/67389.html>. 
35 M. Zygar, Vsja kremlevskaja rat: Kratkaja istorija sovremennoj Rossii (Moscow: Ozon.ru 2016). 
36 Galeotti and Bowen, op. cit. 
37 Zygar, Vsja kremlevskaja rat. 
38 For the same argument, see Kimberly Marten, “Putin's Choices: Explaining Russian Foreign Policy and 
Intervention in Ukraine”, The Washington Quarterly 38:2 (2015), pp. 189-204. 
It also seems that the consequences of the decisions were not considered in detail, as one might 
expect from a rational decision-maker. While it must have been obvious that the annexation 
would place a direct financial burden on Russia’s state budget, this issue was not investigated: 
“If we speak about whether the Ministry of Finance was asked about how much it would cost”, 
said Russian Deputy Finance Minister Tatyana Nesterenko a year later, “I can say no – nobody 
asked. But to answer the question whether the price is appropriate or not, we need to know a 
lot [more]. The level of our competence is not enough to answer this question, and we don’t 
know what information is possessed by the [leader] of our country. […] Such decisions can 
only be taken by one person. I know the president and I can say that he does not make decisions 
lightly. But, in fairness, it was also unexpected for all of us”.39 
 
While we cannot know for sure the extent to which groupthink played a role in the decision-
making regarding the annexation of Crimea, it is clear that alternative explanations 
underpinned by realism, liberalism or constructivism are neither more informed nor more 
rooted in any “hard evidence” of the actual nature of the decision-making. It is not beyond the 
realms of possibility that a future study on political history might advance more such features 
of the decision-making situation that will retrospectively support the groupthink argument, but 
in order for that to happen, it is important that the theoretical plausibility of groupthink to be 
presented first. 
 
Framing the choice as avoiding losses? 
Another psychological theory that might explain the Kremlin’s propensity to take risks in the 
Ukraine conflict is prospect theory. The theory was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky in the 1970s, when they investigated why the behaviour of people so often differs from 
what would be expected to be rational. Prospect theory claims that people are generally risk-
averse in choices involving gains and more likely to be risk-seekers in choices involving losses. 
As many choice situations can be framed in terms of both gains and losses, this notion 
challenges the fundamentals of rationality; instead of choosing on the basis of the outcome’s 
utility value, the way the choice’s starting point is framed affects the preference order.40  
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In international relations, prospect theory has been used to explain why politicians are 
sometimes ready to take overwhelming risks against the odds.41 While Russian foreign policy 
in the Ukraine crisis has not been analysed in academic articles in terms of prospect theory, the 
latter has been utilised in journalistic accounts.42 The argument is that Putin had interpreted the 
political developments in Ukraine in early 2014 as a loss of the preferred status quo. Therefore 
he was ready to take many risks, most notably by invading Crimea, and subsequently in starting 
to support the separatist fighting in Eastern Ukraine. In other words, it was actually weakness, 
not strength that led Russia to invade Crimea. 
 
While prospect theory is usually situated within psychological approaches, a specific feature 
of this approach is that it does not differentiate between individuals but anticipates on the basis 
of average behaviour, at least in repeated or large n contexts, based on a different rationality 
that pure rational choice based on utility values would suggest. It has been found that prospect 
theory generally holds across different cultures, although there are some significant exceptions. 
However, the theory does not contain any clear statement about how the framing exactly 
happens, that is, what the reference point is for gains and losses. The theory, in this sense, has 
problems similar to those in rational choice theory. In retrospect, one can define the reference 
point from the choices, but not independently from the materialized action. In a sense, the 
argument then becomes circular.  
 
However, combined with prevailing definitions of Russia’s national interest or identity, or 
individual decision-maker’s belief system, one might make a fair estimation of the reference 
points of Russian foreign policy, and then draw a conclusion about Russia’s risk-taking 
behaviour. This type of tailored approach would consequently individualise or contextualise 
the otherwise general notion of prospect theory for a certain foreign policy situation and actor. 
Yet, it seems rather commonplace to argue that Ukraine’s tightening relationship with the EU 
in the form of the Association Agreement was framed as a loss, while Ukraine’s entry to the 
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Eurasian Economic Union was framed more as a gain. Therefore, the Euromaidan and the 
revolution in Ukraine was threatening Putin’s previous accomplishments.43 
 
Indeed, in the context of invading Crimea, and particularly with regard to starting the operation 
in Eastern Ukraine, President Putin appears as a risk-taker. Yet, in his subsequent behaviour 
vis-à-vis Ukraine, he became less inclined towards immediate risky operations, such as an open 
military operation against Kiev or actively promoting the separatism of Novorossiya. Instead, 
he has chosen to conduct a covert proxy war there. The readiness to take risks at the beginning 
of the crisis could be explained by his fear of a loss, while the growing risk averseness in the 
course of the crisis would be caused, following the logic of prospect theory, by his willingness 
to defend his initial victories, that is, the annexation of Crimea and the ability to control the 
future of Ukraine through proxies in Donbas. Any risk-taking could easily transform these 
victories into major defeats, both domestically and internationally. 
 
Changing operational code? 
As already noted, psychological approaches suffer from a serious methodological setback – 
similar to the bureaucratic politics approach – in that it is very difficult to obtain any direct 
evidence about the psychological reasoning or sub-conscious motivation of a decision-maker. 
However, approaches such as belief systems, worldviews, cognitive maps, and so forth have 
resolved this problem by resorting to public speeches and other similar available data, which 
can then become an object of content analysis or similar techniques. Before constructivism, 
these approaches were indeed considered rather progressive as they were apt to challenge the 
more traditional realist approaches by adding an ideational dimension to the analysis.44 The 
study of belief systems in particular became a rather popular trend in the study of Soviet foreign 
policy, as part of the older “ideological school”.45  
 
One application of this trend is the study of operational codes, which might also be considered 
“more psychological” than research on belief systems or ideology as it focuses on the 
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worldviews of individuals or small groups. The concept was coined by Nathan Leites in the 
1950s when he studied the operational code of the Bolsheviks, especially that of Lenin and 
Stalin.46 He concluded that this code included such political maxims as pushing to the limits; 
engaging in pursuit of an opponent who begins to retreat or make concessions, but knowing 
when to stop; acting when ready; refusing to be provoked; and agreeing to temporary 
concessions while always keeping the basic conflict and the ultimate victory in mind.  
 
In a sense, the notions or rules are as much about the Russian character as they are about the 
Bolshevik character, because in addition to references to Bolshevik texts, Leites also used 
examples from classical Russian literature. Leites believed that in many cases it was only in 
Russian literature that one could find “a clear and vivid description of the feelings and the 
moral sentiments which are opposed, or continued, in Bolshevik beliefs”.47 For the most part, 
the Bolsheviks, Leites claims, consciously tried to avoid typically irrational or harmful Russian 
behaviour. For instance, it is stated that the Bolshevik operational code denies – in opposition 
to the traditional Russian intelligentsia’s tendency to stress sincerity – the idea that the truth 
should be observed in public statements; instead, any communication should be orientated on 
the basis of impact only.48 A real Bolshevik must also, unlike Russians typically do, “avoid the 
servitude and annihilation which follows from a lack of control over his feelings. He must be 
able to interfere with, release, and simulate emotions”.49 
 
Leites’ sophisticated approach is difficult to replicate or apply to other countries and political 
leaders. It is partly for this reason that it was largely “neglected”, as Alexander George put it, 
when he attempted to popularise the approach.50 George’s major contribution was his 
development of the operational code concept into clear-cut research questions, divided into five 
“philosophical” questions, dealing with the nature of reality, and five “instrumental” questions 
of a more concrete or operational nature.  
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 Suffice it to say that Putin is Russian, but surely not a Bolshevik. Yet, intuitively, Leites’ 
maxims seem consistent with his behaviour. So can we decipher anything more about Putin’s 
thinking patterns? There is at least one attempt to uncover Putin’s operational code, namely 
Stephen Dyson’s analysis written immediately after Putin took up office as President in 2000.51 
While not applying any sophisticated quantitative methodology, Dyson followed George’s 
original methodology rather literally, using as sources of evidence Putin’s personal history, his 
revealing interview-autobiography from 2000, the KGB’s official manual, which Putin is 
supposed to have internalised, as well as his speeches, writings, and deeds, especially in 
connection with the war in Chechnya.  
 
On this basis, Dyson concludes that Putin’s behaviour is characterised by a belief in reciprocity 
in following norms and rules, and that he is inclined to believe in the possibility of harmonious 
political life. However, if he feels that others are not following the jointly agreed-upon norms 
and rules, he is ready to ruthlessly strike back in retaliation. An eye for an eye is his behavioural 
pattern. On the other hand, Putin is not willing to adapt to norms which provide no way out, 
and which serve to limit his freedom. He is inclined to choose political goals that are both 
achievable and measurable, and he works in a step-by-step fashion. All in all, Putin’s world is 
that of both norms and anarchy, allowing both predictable and risky behaviour. Dyson 
concluded that “Putin is unlikely to make rash, impulsive or emotional gestures that interfere 
with the rationality of political exchange”, but he warned that “a breakdown in cooperation will 
likely be bitter and long-lived”.52  
 
Looking at Dyson’s 2001 analysis fifteen years later, it seems to capture the essence of Putin’s 
worldview, as expressed perhaps most clearly in his October 2014 Valdai speech.53 As Allison 
has pointed out, Russia also explains its action in the Crimean case by referring to legal 
frameworks and language.54 On the other hand, contemporary Russia continues the tradition of 
couching its basic foreign and security policy line in very rational language and in the form of 
formal strategies, such as the December 2014 updated version of Russia’s military doctrine. 
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 As such, the operational-code type of approach does not offer any explanations as to individual 
decision-making situations, such as the annexation of Crimea, but rather helps in understanding 
Putin’s specific rationality. While political leaders’ operational codes can be reconstructed 
from public sources, and something about their expected actions and reactions in different 
situations can be inferred on that basis, it was originally assumed that operational codes had 
already been developed in childhood or early adulthood and rarely changed much in later 
phases of life. This assumption, however, has been challenged by the new wave of studies in 
operational codes that started in the late 1990s. Based on George’s original two sets of 
questions, but now enhanced with rather sophisticated data treatment software, this research 
has analysed huge quantities of text, often produced before and after some kind of significant 
event or crisis. Taken together, the evidence thus acquired shows that the operational codes of 
such political figures as Lyndon B. Johnson,55 Jimmy Carter,56 Bill Clinton,57 George W. 
Bush,58 Mao Zedong,59 Fidel Castro, and Kim Il-sung,60 have experienced a measurable 
change.  
 
A noteworthy observation regarding George’s two sets of questions – the first set concerning 
philosophical conceptions and the other more instrumental issues – is that it was in the more 
fundamental philosophical set where the significant changes were identified.61 This is 
completely at odds with the traditional perspective on foreign policy learning, according to 
which basic beliefs are the most durable ones, whereas policies and tactics are more subject to 
change. In the study of Soviet foreign policy, for instance, this had always been the mainstream 
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view.62 Instead, the latest research suggests that when the fundamental beliefs of policy-makers 
change, their modus operandi remains largely unchanged.  
 
If the operational code undergoes a significant change, however, one faces the puzzle of 
whether the concept is merely an analytical descriptive tool or whether it can also explain and 
predict the foreign policy decisions of leaders. Was Putin the same in 2014 as he was in 2000? 
Indeed, there used to be a discussion about Putin I and Putin II, that is, the difference between 
his foreign policies during the first and second presidential terms. Andrei Tsygankov, for 
instance, described Putin I in terms of his perceived world as “terrorism and economic 
competition”, and in terms of Russia’s national interests as “cooperation with the West”.63 
However, Putin II’s perceived world was based on the failure of genuine partnership with the 
West and characterised as “US unilateralism”, whereas Russia’s national interests in this 
context would have been to demonstrate “assertiveness”. Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential term 
again changed the foreign policy course towards cooperation (“reset”), his perception of the 
world being “opportunities for economic cooperation” and national interests duly defined as 
“alliances for modernisation”. While some prefer to label Medvedev’s term, during which 
Putin served as Prime Minister, as Putin III, all the analyses of Putin’s policies and beliefs 
identify change over time.64 This has naturally led to speculation about a more ideological, 
nationalist Putin IV.  
 
In any event, even the best-informed Russian analysts failed to anticipate the major change that 
the Ukrainian crisis produced. This might be interpreted in such a way that while a certain 
reorientation towards more anti-Western foreign policy occurred immediately after Putin began 
his third term as president in May 2012, the Ukrainian crisis – the failure of his efforts to stop 
Ukraine’s association with the EU, the Euromaidan movement, the collapse of the Viktor 
Yanukovych regime and his fleeing the country – was an unexpected catalyst for the Russian 
leadership. The documentary broadcast one year after the event, in which Putin disclosed the 
decision-making related to the annexation of Crimea, was interpreted by some Russian political 
                                                             
62 Jan F. Triska, “Model for Study of Soviet Foreign Policy”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. LII, 
No 1 (1958), pp. 64-83; Philipp E. Tetlock, “Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy”, in George W. 
Breslauer and Philip K. Tetlock, Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991). 
63 Andrei Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, 3rd Ed. (Lanham, 
MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), p. 236. 
64 Dmitri Trenin (ed.), Russia on the Move (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 
available at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/russia_on_the_move.pdf>; Elena Shestopal, New Trends in 
Russian Political Mentality: Putin 3.0 (Lanham, MA, Lexington Books, 2016). 
analysts as bearing the hallmarks of a rather impulsive decision, triggered by the feeling of 
betrayal and reinforced by Putin’s contempt of Western political leaders who did not, in his 
view, take Russia’s interests and Russia’s leader seriously enough.65 
 
Operational code analysis cannot, of course, fully explain Russia’s or Putin’s decision to invade 
the Crimean Peninsula. But one could argue that without the change in Putin’s answers to the 
“philosophical questions”, one could hardly understand the decision to violate the sovereignty 
principle that was rooted in Putin’s legalistic worldview. Indeed, the proposal in the current 
operational code literature that the fundamental ideas of a political leader are more susceptible 
to change than instrumental beliefs could be supported by some evidence in Putin’s case. His 
fundamental beliefs changed from the possibility of cautious pragmatic cooperation and 
harmony with the West, based on the balance of power and sovereignty, towards proclaiming 
a much more ideologised antagonism.66 But his operative approach towards Ukraine, when he 
had decided to act, was fundamentally the same as his treatment of Chechnya in 1999/the early 
2000s and Georgia in 2008 despite the greater risks in the Ukrainian case. 
 
A childhood trauma?  
So-called psychological profiling is commonplace in diplomatic reports, intelligence services 
and everyday journalism.67 Indeed, the fact that individuals have different psychological 
characteristics is not something that rationalist-oriented analysts would dispute. Henry 
Kissinger, a personal acquaintance of Putin, wrote a brief psychological profile of Vladimir 
Putin back in the early 2000s, which reads as follows:  
 
Unlike his predecessor [Boris Yeltsin], who cut his political teeth in the power struggles 
of the Communist Party, Putin emerged from the world of the secret police. Advancement 
in that shadowy world presupposes a strong nationalist commitment and a cool, analytical 
streak. It leads to a foreign policy comparable to that during the tsarist centuries, 
grounding popular support in a sense of Russian mission and seeking to dominate 
neighbors where they cannot be subjugated. With respect to other powers, it involves a 
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combination of pressures and inducements, the proportion between which is reached by 
careful, patient, and cautious manipulations of the balance of power.68 
 
However, should one employ psychological profiling, one would need to dig deeper than 
Kissinger. In the study of history, this approach is usually called psychohistory.69 To be sure, 
psychohistory is itself such a multifaceted approach that whole books have been written about 
its internal differences. There is no single uniform theory or methodology; some authors have 
applied psychoanalysis, some medical analysis, whereas others base their arguments on 
everyday psychology. In Soviet studies, Joseph Stalin, not surprisingly, has been a fruitful 
target of this type of approach, practised most notably by Robert C. Tucker. From this 
viewpoint, Stalin’s general political behaviour was explained by his personality, rooted in the 
violent experiences of his childhood, which – so the argument went – gave rise to his 
narcissistic cult of personality and era of the Terror, mirroring his inner conflicts and self-
hatred.70 
 
Putin’s psychology is a constant theme in popular literature and nonscientific articles, 
stemming from the assumption that when normal democratic political institutions do not 
function and the country is led by an authoritarian leader, then “one cannot understand Russia’s 
politics without psychology”.71 At the same time, however, one hardly knows how decisions 
are arrived at because Putin’s rise to power “sharply increased the level of secrecy in the work 
of the authorities”.72 Given Putin’s power and the cult surrounding him, it is no wonder that 
also scholars with diverse background have attempted to provide a psychological profile of 
Putin’s personality. Yet in the various accounts of Putin’s personality, there is no prevailing 
view with regard to Putin as a risk-taker: some see Putin as a personality willing to take risks, 
while others emphasise that he is very careful in his moves.73 
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 Drawing on psychoanalysis, Juhani Ihanus describes how Putin’s life was, from an early age, 
characterised by fighting his way forward.74 Putin did not receive much support from his 
parents, who showed little “Vova” no demonstrable affection. The child’s physical stress and 
frustration led him to suppress his emotions as there was no way to vent them. Putin’s adult 
character was subsequently born of a fear of feelings and affection, a kind of encapsulation, 
which was reflected in his personal identity, and which shaped his future actions in society. 
Putin’s full identity was formed in the axis of this rather prosaic personal tragedy and in the 
pressure of the totalitarian social system, finally finding a balance in the role of a secret service 
agent. However, surprised by his sudden success, when he became Prime Minister and then 
President, and following the first political struggles, Putin’s character changed  – to quote 
Ihanus – to that of “a rational terminator”, who despised the enemies of the state. At first, it 
was the Chechens in particular who were punished for their attempt to destroy the state. Putin 
then went on to restore the glory of the Soviet security service, the KGB, hanging a picture of 
his idol, Yuri Andropov, the former KGB director and subsequent party leader, on his wall, 
and taking steps to recreate a strong state. Putin, looking inside himself,  instinctively felt that 
only hard top-down discipline could bring salvation to the Russian people and mitigate their 
collective internal contradictions and restlessness; a totalitarian psyche, which, when 
confronted with freedom, turned to self-accusations and shame. That conflict could be settled 
by directing this shame towards external parties, and instilling blind confidence in the state 
executive. Personally, Putin concealed his internal feelings of shame by resorting to anger and 
rage, hiding all signs of weakness, resorting to force as the only way to avoid being insulted 
and humiliated. He arranged his features into a frozen expression, thus involuntarily defending 
his vulnerable feelings, which he was incapable of expressing. When he became a public figure, 
his media advisors had difficulty teaching him to express some kind of contrived semblance of 
a smile. Ultimately, Putin suppressed his internal conflicts with narcissism, which is typical of 
all dictators. It led to wholesale dominance and the inevitable creation of Putinism, casting the 
environment and society at large according to his own image. But before long, an awareness 
of his own aging and eventually demise came into the picture. This feeling of weakness and 
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inevitable mortality – as Ihanus predicted in 2008 before the Georgian war – would eventually 
shred the internal protective veil, and would be likely to lead to aggressive and sadistic 
behaviour. 
 
In the same spirit, in a lengthy interview, the Swiss psychoanalyst Philipp Jaffe expressed the 
view that Putin’s actions as president are characterised by some kind of childhood trauma 
related to weakness.75 He claimed that from the perspective of a professional psychoanalyst 
utilising psychobiography as a method, it was not necessary to personally know the subject 
under analysis; close investigation of what was known about the person’s biography, 
personality, and professional interactions would suffice. What was noteworthy in his 
assessment was that Putin takes any criticism against Russia personally, and tries to retaliate 
with force. “All of this is due to his childhood,” Jaffe claims. “He has to prove that it is better 
not to engage in a dispute with him. When other children shove him, he shows his physical 
strength in no uncertain terms. His driving force is to see to it that no one can ever control him.” 
According to Jaffe, Putin has transferred these personal characteristics into his political 
activities, which is why he has achieved almost absolute power in Russia. The psychoanalyst 
sees Putin as a very intelligent person, who nonetheless suffers from a number of complexes. 
Upon reaching a position of relatively unlimited power, such a person may develop several 
other syndromes.  
 
The notion of “childhood trauma” and “emotional chaos” producing a narcissistic and bullying 
personality is reiterated in many journalistic accounts. According to these stories, Putin 
apparently grew up feeling that he had some kind of internal defect, harbouring thoughts that 
there was something about himself that was damaged and shameful. So he developed a 
defensive identity to hide his subconscious shame and to prove that he was a winner instead.76 
Just what this trauma was exactly remains unclear, but in Putin’s unauthorised biographies it 
is always emphasised how his point of departure was one of poverty and physical weakness, 
and how he had to fight his way up amongst the thugs that populated the courtyard where he 
used to hang out as a child:  
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 Putin, younger than the thugs and slight of build, tried to hold his own with 
them. ‘If anyone ever insulted him in anyway’, his friend recalled, ‘Volodya 
would immediately jump on the guy, scratch him, bite him, rip his hair out by 
the clump – do anything at all never to allow anyone to humiliate him in any 
way’.77 
 
It is well documented that Putin started training in martial arts, first boxing and then Sambo, a 
Soviet-style judo, so that he could handle himself even better on the street. The biographical 
evidence suggests that his growing physical prowess, later supplemented with a junior position 
in the most feared institution in the Soviet Union, the KGB, made him no less impulsive or 
violent, but certainly much calmer and self-confident when he encountered physically 
challenging situations.78  
 
Putin has duly managed to turn his tough childhood experiences to his advantage, indeed into 
a mythology, emphasising his antisocial characteristics. In his interview-based autobiography, 
he boasted thus:  
 
Q: Why did you not get inducted into the Pioneer Organization until sixth grade? Were 
things really so bad?  
Putin: Of course, I was a hooligan, not a Pioneer.  
Q: Are you trying to be modest?  
Putin: Now you are insulting me? I was indeed a thug.79  
 
In October 2015, in the final session of the so-called Valdai discussions, Putin publically 
informed the audience (referring to Syria): “Even 50 years ago, the streets of Leningrad taught 
me one thing: if a fight is inevitable, go and fight first.” This typical Putinesque quote quickly 
hit the headlines worldwide, and NATO’s official commentators did not hesitate to tweet it. 
 
                                                             
77 Masha Gessen, The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (New York: Riverhead Books, 
2012), p. 38. 
78 Ibid. 
79 N. Gevorkyan, A. Kolesnikov and N. Timakova, Ot pervogo litsa. Razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym 
(Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), p. 19. 
Perhaps the best-known Western analysts of Putin’s personality, Fiona Hill and Clifford G. 
Gaddy, claim that the Russian leader suffers from a “personality disorder” caused by the fact 
that he actually has several identities, which are in conflict with each other.80 Indeed, many in 
the West tend to see Putin’s personality in a rather negative light. He has been called a “high-
dominance introvert”, with a mindset characterised by a tendency to view the world as a 
conflictual zero-sum game, and reliant on an expansionist orientation in foreign affairs,81  or 
that “contempt” is the key to his psychological profile.82 Some journalists have noted a peculiar 
trait in that he does not respect other people’s property, but thinks instead that everything is his 
for the taking.83 A simple google search of “Is Putin a psychopath?” returns hundreds of 
thousands of hits. Among them is a comment by Latvia’s former president, Vaira Vīķe-
Freiberga, who was trained as a clinical psychologist and worked in that field for many years. 
She however was talking of the whole of Russia when arguing that, “We share a common 
border with a psychopathic power, which lives by useless and dangerous illusions […] One 
mustn’t be sentimental about the mysterious Russian soul; one must be alert when one lives 
next to a psychopath”.84 
 
Moreover, it has also been suggested that Putin has “an autistic disorder which affects all of 
his decisions”. This was reportedly the outcome of a Pentagon-sponsored study conducted by 
Brenda Connors at the US Naval War College in 2008.85 Although the experts were not able to 
clinically confirm that Putin suffers from Asperger’s syndrome in the absence of a brain scan, 
they found symptoms that were similar: for example difficulties staying calm in social settings 
and low thresholds to be reactive. In another study, neurologists have discussed the reason for 
Putin’s “virtually absent right arm swing”. While they rejected the diagnosis of Parkinson’s 
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disease or a preclinical stage of the disease, as Putin’s motor skills are otherwise excellent, they 
suggest that this so-called “gunslinger’s gait” is a behavioural adaptation resulting from Putin’s 
intelligence training. The fact that Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev walks in the same way, 
without having a military or intelligence background, is duly explained by the suggestion that 
Medvedev has learned to imitate his boss, an imitation phenomenon that has parallels in the 
neurological field in cases of a disorder known as hyperekplexia.86  
 
To sum up, the psycho-historical approach and other attempts to define Putin’s personality, in 
addition to their theoretical and methodological problems, are rather speculative due to the 
nature of the sources they rely upon, and can therefore often reflect more the imagination and 
biases of the theorist than the object. The fact that the Western mass media and social media 
are awash with such interpretations contributes to the notion that the West is demonising Putin, 
with suggestions that he is a typical narcissist, suffers from a severe psychological disorder 
rooted in his childhood, and had a family life marred by trauma and emotional chaos. The 
sources underpinning such analyses are bound to be mainly second-hand and indirect, and most 
likely anecdotal. They are seldom nuanced enough to account for any variation and are often 
part of the psychological warfare in a conflict situation. Yet such narratives may challenge us 
to think more systematically about possible character traits. If we trust these accounts, the tough 
overall attitude of Russia’s foreign policy and its impulsivity can, at times, be seen as 
compatible with the general perception of Putin’s personality.  
 
While psychohistorical narratives and psychological profiling are rather far removed from any 
credible explanation of Russia’s decision-making, we should nevertheless be ready to widen 
foreign policy analysis theoretically to include the possibility of such factors. We should also 
pose a counterfactual question: Would Russia have invaded Crimea under a different president 
with a different psychological profile? Counterfactual theories of causation take as their point 
of departure the basic idea that the meaning of causal claims can be explained in the form of 
“If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred”. 87 While there are several versions within 
this debate, it is difficult to form a strong contrafactual for Putin’s role in the Crimean case. 
Even if Putin’s psychological characteristics were part of the explanation, they would not 
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provide sufficient reasons for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. It is possible that had the 
circumstances been different, the annexation would not have occurred under Putin, or had there 
been another president, Russia would have reacted to the developments in Ukraine differently. 
Such an argument would contest the tenet of Mearsheimerian realism according to which any 
rational Russian statesman would have behaved similarly towards the external threat, but in all 
fairness to neorealism for example Kenneth Waltz would not make such a claim. By contrast, 
in his Man, State, and War he made it clear that the structure of the international system does 
not directly cause one state to attack another, but psychological factors can trigger a particular 
war.88  
 
An “angry, angry man”? 
Was the annexation of Crimea an impulsive and angry reaction to the revolution in Kiev rather 
than a long-planned territorial expansion? The question of the role of emotions in Russian 
foreign policy decision-making is not a new theme, but it has not been properly integrated into 
academic research. One reason for this is that emotions are often seen as pejorative and 
contributing to.conjecture about a special Russian character or abnormality. For example, 
Dmitri Trenin and Bobo Lo have argued (referring more to Western descriptions of Yeltsin 
than of Putin) that “there exists an implicit assumption that Russian policy-makers behave 
inherently less rationally than their foreign counterparts, being driven not so much by concrete 
national interests as by highly subjective and even personal impulses”.89 Trenin and Lo 
conclude that the unfortunate consequence of such arbitrary decisions about what is and is not 
rational is that Russia has been transformed from an object of serious scientific enquiry into a 
mystical and virtually “unknowable” entity.90 Although we may not obtain definitive answers, 
we should nevertheless consider how the role of emotions in Russian foreign policy might be 
formulated and how meaningful research into the subject can be conducted. 
 
Two opposing stereotypes of Russians in general, and of Russian political leaders in particular, 
have a long pedigree in the literature as well as in contemporary narratives about Russians.91 
One such stereotype is the cold-blooded, calculating chess-player with a long-term plan who 
contemplates every move rationally. Then there is the emotional type who reacts impulsively; 
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guided by his feelings, he does everything to excess, and lives in the moment. In Russian 
politics, emotions are typically attributed to some leaders more than to others. Whereas 
President Boris Yeltsin was often characterised as an emotional figure, Putin has typically been 
regarded as his opposite: an officer with a KGB background who only serves the Russian 
national interest and does not reveal anything about his inner life  – the “man without a face”.92 
In Leites’ terms, he would be a perfect Bolshevik, someone who does not allow himself to be 
swayed by typical Russian sentimentalism.  
 
There are numerous examples that support this view of Putin as a calculating, rational thinker. 
In his Munich speech in 2007, which some have dubbed the back-to-the-Cold-War speech, 
Putin expressed himself in almost game-theoretical terms: “I would not want anyone to suspect 
any aggressive intentions on our part. But the system of international relations is just like 
mathematics. There are no personal dimensions”.93 Moreover, in December 2015 he 
categorically stated that, “Emotions are inevitable, but they should not affect the quality of 
decisions, because these decisions are in the interests of millions of people, millions of Russian 
citizens”.94 In an interview in June 2015, Putin emphasised that Russia’s logic is that of the 
security dilemma, that is, a reaction against external threats: “Everything we do is just a 
response to the threats emerging against us. Besides, what we do is limited in scope and scale, 
but is, however, sufficient to ensure Russia’s security”.95  
 
In journalistic accounts, references to Putin’s emotions, or rather the lack thereof, are 
commonplace. For example, when Putin had to address the Kursk submarine tragedy at the 
beginning of his presidential career, he was seen as being emotionally cold. It is almost as if he 
prefers that image. When he was seen in tears after the 2012 presidential elections, it was due 
to the wind, and not his emotions, explained Putin’s spokesman. Yet Putin often expressed his 
emotions when issues related to terrorism in the North Caucasus were discussed. Indeed, the 
principal emotion attributed to Putin is anger. For example, Richard Stengel, the managing 
editor of Time magazine described Putin as an “angry, angry man” when announcing that he 
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had been chosen as Person of the Year 2007. Others have noted that, “Putin’s judo training 
taught him to control his emotions, but when he is angry his outbursts can be not only crude 
but breathtakingly acerbic”.96 
 
Putin’s emotions, as the president of Russia, cannot be understood without the social context 
of the extended self of Russia. Putin himself, especially when addressing a Russian audience, 
is reminiscent of the mythological notion of an idealistic Russian soul:  
 
Of course, we are less pragmatic, less calculating than representatives of other peoples, 
and we have bigger hearts. Maybe this is a reflection of the grandeur of our country and 
its boundless expanses. Our people have a more generous spirit.97 
 
Putin’s hardline policy towards the West can also be seen as reflecting cultural models rather 
than individual impulses.98 It is difficult to say exactly how prevalent and accepted anger is as 
an emotion in Russian culture, but it is hardly merely an irrational sentiment. Displays of anger 
are quite common in Russian political and business life. Guides to business etiquette in Russia 
may, for example, advise: “Expect your Russian colleagues to get angry, walk out of a meeting 
and/or talk about ending their relationship with you in their effort to make you give more 
concessions during a negotiation”.99  
 
There is a fine line between assertiveness and anger in Russia, and hence displays of anger 
often reflect superiority and determination, convey an image of effectiveness and can also 
increase a politician’s domestic popularity.100 It can be suggested that Putin’s emotional 
outbursts may have helped achieve some foreign policy goals. For example, his speech at the 
Munich security conference in 2007, in which he sharply criticised the United States and its 
planned missile defence system, received particular attention because of its angry tone. The 
speech was important because Putin was able to shift the agenda from democracy development 
in Russia to military strategic issues between the West and Russia. Russians themselves, 
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however, have claimed that Putin’s speech in Munich was “calculated” and not “emotional”, 
although it may have sounded so.101 As Todd Hall notes, it is typical for political actors 
themselves to deny that they were driven by emotions, even when the evidence suggests that 
they were.102 
 
Anger is typically seen as an emotion conducive to inflicting harm on the other and motivating   
costly punishments.103 It is nonetheless important to remember that anger is not merely a 
negative emotion that always results in violent behaviour, but that it can also be seen as a 
constructive emotion aimed at addressing and rectifying wrongdoings rather than dissolving a 
relationship.104 Even when aggression is caused by anger, often its point is not so much to hurt 
the other as to send a message about a perceived injustice.105 Moreover, anger is not simply an 
impulsive emotional outburst, but can oftentimes be a long-lasting disposition.106 It can explain 
the fixation of the angered party on an issue even when the chances of influencing the issue 
have passed. Another action tendency found in psychological studies is that “people feeling 
angry had more optimistic risk assessments than did people feeling fear”.107 
 
The source of anger is often related to offences against identity or violations of key rights and 
moral codes. Thus Russia   has reacted angrily to NATO expansion, the Kosovo war, or missile 
defence that are not simply security issues but heavily loaded with the quest for underlying 
principles and norms, and Russia’s desire to regain status as a great power on a par with the 
West.108 The circumstantial evidence that Russian decision-makers took offence, and that the 
Ukrainian crisis constituted not only a potential threat but the ‘unconstitutional revolution’ was 
seen as a breach of fundamental norms as well as a direct insult to Russia’s identity as a great 
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power, is overwhelming. It is possible to support this interpretation both on the basis of public 
statements and appearances. For instance, in his Crimea speech on 18 March 2014, when 
referring to the West, Putin claimed that:  
 
 […] they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed 
us before an accomplished fact. […] They are constantly trying to sweep us into 
a corner because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and 
because we call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there 
is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed 
the line, playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally.109 
 
Hence, there is reason to believe that anger has been a genuinely important element in Russian 
foreign policy in the Ukrainian conflict. As Tsygankov claims, “the support for Crimea and 
hostility toward the Ukrainian revolution must be understood as a reflective reaction to what 
the Kremlin views as neglect of Russia’s values and interests and unjust treatment by the 
West”.110 It is clear to see that there have been subjective grounds for Russia to be angry about 
the behaviour of the West in relation to the crisis in Ukraine, and Russian foreign policy 
behaviour also seemed to follow the logic of anger. The issue was at the heart of Russian 
identity, as well as Putin’s sense of justice. Hence Russia reacted in line with action tendencies 
associated with anger by using sharp language, inflicting harm, and even instigating a 
hazardous, violent campaign.  
 
Conclusions  
 
This article has considered a range of psychological theories applicable to the study of Russian 
foreign policy, focusing in particular on Russia’s decision to invade and then annex the 
Crimean Peninsula. The chosen approach emphasises the specific role and character of the key 
decision-maker in the case, President Putin, but psychological approaches should not be 
equated with individual-level explanations. The relevant information and data available on the 
current decision-making situation are not abundant enough for the psychological explanations 
and interpretations discussed above to be validated beyond reasonable doubt, and unfortunately 
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it is unlikely that much new “hard evidence” could be presented in the near future. However, 
realist, liberal and constructivist theories all contain assumptions about decision-making that 
they cannot prove with much concrete evidence when providing explanations for particular 
cases. Although psychological approaches entail methodological and evidence-related 
problems, there are both practical and theoretical reasons for integrating them more effectively 
into the academic research on Russian (or any nation’s) foreign policy.  
 
Psychological approaches can generate new research questions and resolve some of the existing 
puzzles in the analysis of foreign policy. While it is difficult to come up with a definitive 
explanation based solely on psychology, it is possible to advance partial explanations of 
Russia’s behaviour and validate these to the extent that they are plausible in the light of the 
available evidence consisting of the circumstantial knowledge of the decision-making situation 
and congruence with the policy outcomes. While external power relations, domestic politics 
and national identities cannot be omitted as structural conditions having causal impact, the 
psychological dimension of Russian foreign policy, focusing on the main decision-maker, 
President Vladimir Putin, can still be crucial. These psychological factors should be seen as 
part of the overall explanation alongside the IR grand theories. In terms of counterfactuals, we 
can consider the psychological factors as causal triggers of the decision in certain structural 
conditions, or intervening variables that explain the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables,111 without which the foreign policy behaviour would be different.  
 
Taking all of the above into account, has our approach been able to shed any light on Russia’s 
decision to invade Ukraine and annex Crimea? Not as much as we had hoped perhaps and at 
least not with any certainty. Yet, the psychological approaches pass the ‘hoop test’: groupthink, 
prospect theory, the operational code and the personality of the main decision-maker, as well 
as situational emotions can explain some important aspects of Russian foreign policy, in 
particular, why the propensity to take risks in the context of the Ukraine crisis had risen. In this 
way, they do not hamper the intellectual effort to understand Russian foreign policy, but 
actually facilitate it. Nothing in realist, liberal or constructivist theories deny their possible role. 
Indeed, even advocates of rational choice admit that psychological approaches perform “at 
least as well as rational choice methods, because the former accept all the variables that the 
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latter recognize as important in explaining a case”. True, rationalists do not regard this as a sign 
of theoretical superiority, but rather only as proof of greater “descriptive accuracy of an 
individual case”.112 Nevertheless, we consider that Russian foreign policy studies can pave the 
way for concrete research on the role of these factors in international affairs in general, without 
singling Russia out as a special, anomalous case.  
                                                             
112 James D. Morrow, “A Rational Choice Approach to International Conflict”, in Alex Mintz and Nehemia 
Geva, (eds.), Decision-Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1997), pp. 11-31, here pp. 29, 30. 
